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ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF PRICE REGU-
LATIONS-A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATION OF A
STATUTE
By LEANORA SCHWARTZ GRUBER t
The legal problems that confronted the Administrator of the Office
of Price Administration in establishing and maintaining regulations
during the statutory life of the agency 1 were many and diverse. They
may roughly be divided into four categories, based upon the time when
the particular problems were first acutely presented to the Adminis-
trator: 2 (1) Problems in connection with establishing a regulation in
the first instance during wartime or the emergency period thereafter;
(2) those concerned with the maintenance of prices during the wartime
period; (3) the problems of the transition period (between V-E Day
and June 30, 1946) ; (4) and finally the problems of the last year of
price control, i. e., the new problems presented by the Price Control
Extension Act of 1946.' It is the purpose of this article to deal with
each of these in turn.'
I. ESTABLISHING A REGULATION
The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 set forth several gen-
eral principles for the guidance of the Price Administrator in deter-
mining whether to bring a commodity or group of commodities under
control, and if so, at what level. In the judgment of the Price Ad-
ministrator, the price of the commodity must have risen or have been
threatening to rise "to an extent or in a manner inconsistent with the
purposes of this Act"; the prices established were required to be "gen-
erally fair and equitable"; they had to effectuate the purposes of the
Act; and "so far as practicable," the Administrator was required to
"ascertain and give due consideration to the prices prevailing between
October 1 and October 15, 1941," with the direction to make adjust-
t B. A., 1936, Cornell University; LL. B., 1939, Columbia University; Member of
the New York and Supreme Court Bar; formerly Editor Columbia Law Review; for-
merly Attorney with Social Security Board, Washington, D. C.; Chief, Textiles and
Leather Branch, and Special Appellate Attorney with the Office of Price Administra-
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1. Established by the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 STAr. 23, 50 U. S.
C. App., §§ 901-946 (Supp. 1942). Throughout this article the Emergency Price Con-
trol Act will be referred to as the "Act."
2. It should be kept in mind throughout that a problem once having arisen usually
recurred throughout the life of the agency.
3. 60 STAT. 664, 50 U. S. C. A. App. 901a (1946).
4. Problems arising during the period prior to the statute under the predecessor
of the Office of Price Administration (Office of Price Administration and Civilian Sup-
ply) are outside the scope of this article.
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ments for various relevant factors of general applicability such as
"speculative fluctuations, general increases or decreases in costs of
production . . general increases or decreases in profits earned by
sellers of the commodity . . during and subsequent to the year ended
October 1, 1941. . . . " In addition the Act established special ad-
ditional standards for agricultural commodities 6 and for products
processed from agricultural commodities.7
In most instances, the first determination, i. e., that prices had
risen or were threatening to rise "to an extent or in a manner incon-
sistent with the purposes of this Act," presented no problem. The
economic situation was such that it was clear that once the price of a
commodity started to rise, nothing was likely to prevent continued in-
creases short of the establishment of maximum prices.
In one notable instance, however, compliance with the statutory
requirement, although easily possible, required greater explanation
since the compliance was less obvious. This was in connection with
the issuance of the General Maximum Price Regulation in April, 1942.8
In the early days of price control-statutory and pre-statutory-it was
hoped that selective control at some levels would be sufficient to stem
inflation.' It was hoped primarily that controls at the retail level could
be avoided because of the obvious administrative difficulties both in
establishing retail regulations and in enforcing them. But shortly after
the passage of the Act, it became apparent that nothing short of almost
overall control within the statutory limits would be effective in holding
down prices then being forced up by the well known wartime inflation-
ary pressures. 10 Since immediate action was necessary, the most
expeditious solution was the issuance of an overall regulation covering
at all levels of production and distribution the vast majority of com-
modities at that time still uncontrolled [there were at that time only
about 150 regulations] and covering at previously uncontrolled levels
many commodities already controlled at one or more levels.
Obviously it could not be ascertained that prices of each com-
modity at all levels to be controlled had actually risen. The alternative




8. 7 FED. REG. 3153 (1942).
9. FmST QUARTERLY REPORT OF TE OFFICE OF PRICE ADmINISTRATIO, submitted
on July 27, 1942, pp. 20, 24, and 30; Statement of Considerations for General Maximum
Price Regulation, OPA Service, 11:115.
10. Statement of Considerations for General Maximum Price Regulation, OPA
Service, 11:115.
11. The validity of the issuance of the General Maximum Price Regulation was
raised in Philadelphia Coke Co. v. Bowles, 139 F. 2d 349 (E. C. A. 1943). The court
there pointed out that the Administrator had authority to issue a universal price regu-
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commodities and services generally are rising and threatening further
to rise," " and that they present a "grave threat to . . .the stability of
the national economy." 13
After the issuance of the General Maximum Price Regulation, the
problem of prices rising or threatening to rise was reduced to in-
significance; regulations issued thereafter mainly established new prices
for, or new methods of pricing, commodities already covered by the
General Maximum Price Regulation. Almost solely in the case of
agricultural commodities which were, in the main, excluded from the
General Maximum Price Regulation, 4 was the problem acutely pre-
sented thereafter.
The next consideration, that of general fairness and equity, while
extremely significant, did not present too many problems at the outset.
Overall standards of general fairness and equity were early developed
and were applied throughout the life of the agency. These standards
established minimum requirements which had to be met in every in-
stance. But, as explained in a memorandum subritted to both the
House 5 and Senate ' Banking and Currency Committees in the course
of their hearings on the renewal of the Price 'Control Act in 1944, the
effectuation of the purposes of the Act rarely required that the maxi-
mum price first established for a commodity be at or near minimum
levels of general fairness and equity. Furthermore, the prices in effect
during the October 1-15, 1941 period, or during any other representa-
tive period,' 7 normally exceeded the minimum price that could be estab-
lished. In view of the desirability, in the interest of a stable price
structure, of permitting some cushion in prices which would permit the
absorption of future cost increases, only prices somewhat above the
minimum levels could, at that time, have carried out the purposes of
the Act. 8 Accordingly the question of setting prices so low as to be
not generally fair and equitable was scarcely then a problem.
As originally enacted, the Act set up additional standards, very
limiting in nature,19 to be met in setting prices for agricultural com-
lation when prices in general threatened to rise in a manner inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the Act. At the time of the issuance of the General Maximum Price Regula-
tion such a situation existed and the fact that the complainant's product posed no indi-
vidual threat was immaterial.
12. Statement of Considerations, supra note 10, at 11:116.
13. Id. at 11:111.
14. § 9(a) (1).
15. Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency on H. R. 4376, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1997 (1944).
16. Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 1764, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1426 (1944).
17. Suggested as a guide by § 1 (a) of the Act.
18. Hearings, supra note 15, at 1997-8.
19. SECOND QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE OrricE OF PRICE ADmNiSTRATION, sub-
mitted November 28, 1942, pp. 5, 11.
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modities and processed agricultural commodities. These concerned the
level of prices. For an agricultural commodity, the price established
had to be no lower than the highest of the following: (1) 110% of
parity or of the comparable price; 20 (2) the prevailing market price
on October 1, 1941; (3) the prevailing market price on December 15,
1941; or, (4) the average price during July 1, 1919 to June 30, 1929.1
For processed agricultural commodities, the price established was re-
quired at least to reflect to producers of the agricultural commodity the
minimum permissible maximum price for the agricultural commodity.2
These standards were so restrictive that relatively few maximum prices
(in view of the necessity for total coverage) were established there-
under,23 although many other commodities should have been controlled
at prices below the then permissible levels to bring them into line with
the levels of prices set by other regulations, notably the General
Maximum Price Regulation.24
In April, 1942, the President recognized the dangers involved and
requested Congress to amend the Act to establish more liberal stand-
ards.2" Finally, the Stabilization Act of 1942 26 was passed, estab-
lishing more satisfactory substitute standards. These provided, in gen-
eral, that the maximum price for an agricultural commodity must not
be lower than the higher of the parity (or comparable) price, or the
highest price received by producers between January 1, 1942 and
September 15,' 1942. The Administrator was, however, given discre-
tion in certain instances to go below the January 1-September 15 price
if the price established reflected parity. For processed agricultural com-
modities, the maximum price was required at least to reflect the maxi-
mum price to producers of the raw material and an equitable margin
for processing.
These modified standards permitted the establishment of maximum
prices for a vastly increased number of agricultural commodities and
processed agricultural commodities at prices more nearly in line with
the prices established for other products, and immediately resulted in
20. For a variety of reasons, such as because the product was not commercially
produced in the base period, parity prices cannot be determined for some agricultural
commodities. As to some such commodities, the Secretary of Agriculture publishes
a "comparable" price which, in general, is the Secretary's informed guess as to what
the parity price would be if it were calculable.
21. §3(a).
22. §3 (c).
23. Only 60% of agricultural commodities were covered at the retail level prior to
the change in the statute. THIRD QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF PRICE ADMIN-
isTRATTON, submitted January 19, 1943, 2.
24. SECOND QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 19, at 5 and 25.
25. Presidential message to Congress, April 27, 1942. See FIRST QUARTERLY RE-
PORT, supra note 9, at 35.
26. 56 STAT. 765, § 2, 50 U. S. C. App. § 962 (Supp. 1942).
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the extension of retail food price coverage so that 90% of such prices
were shortly thereafter under control.
2 7
II. MAINTAINING REGULATIONS DURING THE WARTIME PERIOD
Examination of the actions of the Price Administrator during the
war indicates that that period may properly be referred to as the
agency's "freeze" period. Generally, the policy of the agency, follow-
ing the issuance of the General Maximum Price Regulation, was to
permit price increases on the basis of very limited and strictly applied
standards. Increases fell into two main categories: (A) Those that
were required in order to meet the minimum requirements of the law,
i. e., those required either to maintain generally fair and equitable
prices or to meet the requirements of certain special provisions of the
Act subsequently added; (B) and those that were discretionary with
the Administrator.
A. Legally Required Increases
1. On the basis of overriding standards
As indicated above, the Act set forth in general terms the pur-
poses that were to be fostered by, the criteria that were to be used,
and the general standards that were to be met in establishing maximum
price regulations or orders under the Act. The specific and detailed
application of these standards and criteria were left to the discretion of
the Price Administrator.2 A study of the problems involved led the
Administrator to the conclusion that cost absorption to the maximum
extent possible was the only feasible principle to follow in administering
the Act. To assist in determining the "maximum extent possible,"
two specific pricing guides for every day use were formulated. These
two guides were commonly referred to as the "industry earnings" and
the "product" standards, and may be described as follows: The industry
earnings standard provided that a maximum price was to be deemed
generally fair and equitable if it permitted that portion of the industry
responsible for the major part of industry output to earn profits, before
federal income and excess profits taxes and adjusted for changes in
net worth, at least equal to the profits earned during a representative
peacetime period. The product standard was a secondary test used in
conjunction with the industry earnings test only in the case of a multiple
product industry, i. e., an industry which produced or manufactured
27. THImD QuARTERLy REPORT, supra note 23, at 2.
28. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 (1944) ; Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U. S.
182 (1943) ; and Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944) ; all upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Act over objections of undue delegation of legislative power to an
administrative agency.
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more than one major item. It provided that a maximum price for a
commodity produced by a multiple product industry would be con-
sidered generally fair and equitable if it not only met the requirements
of the industry earnings test but also, except where it had been the
industry's practice to sell the commodity below cost, permitted the
highest-cost firms which were not included in the industry's high cost
marginal fringe 29 to recover out-of-pocket costs on the product.30 In
many instances an industry as a whole would show a favorable posi-
tion with reference to profits while a large part of that industry would
be incurring an actual out-of-pocket loss on a particular commodity it
was producing. The Administrator never took the position that any
price for a particular product was fair, no matter how low, merely
because overall peacetime earnings were equalled. Obviously the Ad-
ministrator could not "maintain a ceiling price of one cent for a loaf
of bread merely because bakers . . . (were) doing well on pies, cakes
and cookies. The product standard recognized this. It was developed
precisely for the purpose of giving firm assurance that no such extreme
variations from normal or appropriate price relationships would occur,
or, if they occurred, be maintained." "' These two tests were deemed
to assure, in general, that prices were generally fair and equitable,
although special circumstances sometimes made other variants
necessary.32 '
Although many other standards, usually embodying basic prin-
ciples other than that of cost absorption, were urged upon the Adminis-
trator by persons affected by the Act 33 as well as by individual mem-
bers of Congress,34 the adoption of these two tests appears well founded.
In Section 2 (a) of the Act the Administrator was directed to establish
29. The exclusion of the high cost marginal fringe frequently presented a difficult
administrative problem. As explained to the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency: "We (the OPA) can seldom draw a sharp line to distinguish the so-called
'high-cost marginal sellers' from their competitors. What we are obliged to do is to
meet the out-of-pocket costs of the industry generally. We do not consider ourselves
obliged by the standard to meet out-of-pocket costs which do not appear to be repre-
sentative of the industry's experience." Hearings before the Committee on Banking
and Currency on S. I. Res. 30, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., at 109 (1945).
30. Out-of-pocket costs were generally, for ease of administration, taken as syn-
onymous with factory costs. Hearings, supra note 29, at 109.
31. Hearings, supra note 16, at 1410.
32. Hearings, supra note 29, at 109. See Heinz v. Bowles, 149 F. 2d 277 (E. C. A.
1945), amended on rehearing, 150 F. 2d 546 (E. C. A. 1945).
33. Protestants frequently urged before the Emergency Court of Appeals that cost
increases should result in price increases: U. S. Gypsum Co. v. Brown, 137 F. 2d 360
(E. C. A. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 775 (1943) ; Chatlos v. Brown, 136 F. 2d 490
(E. C. A. 1943); Lakemore v. Brown, 137 F. 2d 355 (E. C. A. 1943); Spaeth v.
Brown, 137 F. 2d 669 (E. C. A. 1943); Philadelphia Coke Co. v. Bowles, 139 F. 2d
349 (E. C. A. 1943) ; Madison Park Corp. v. Bowles, 140 F. 2d 316 (E. C. A. 1943) ;
Interwoven Stocking Co. v. Bowles, 141 F. 2d 696 (E. C. A. 1944). In each case
protestant's claim was dismissed.
34. See, for example, colloquy between Mr. Brownlee (Deputy Administrator of
the OPA) and Senator Taft, Hearings, supra note 16, 188-9.
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prices at the level "prevailing between October 1 and October 15,
1941." However, he was further directed to make "adjustments for
such relevant factors as he may determine and deem to be of general
applicability, including the following: Speculative fluctuations, general
increases or decreases in costs of production, distribution, and trans-
portation, and general increases or decreases in profits earned by sellers
of the commodity or commodities, during and subsequent to the year
ended October 1, 1941." (Emphasis supplied). The implication is
clear that any overall test designed to insure compliance with this
portion of the Act-a portion which may well be deemed the heart of
the Act insofar as pricing standards were concerned-had to be a test
that looked to factors that applied to an industry as a whole, (rather
than to factors affecting individual members of an industry but having
no important bearing on the overall picture) and further had to be a
test that was based on overall industry profits.
The legislative history of the original price control Act also sup-
ported the adoption of the industry earnings standard. The Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, in its report on a bill which
contained language the same as that later found in Section 2 (a) of
the Act said:
". .... The bill does not guarantee a profit to each individual
seller. It requires instead that. . . prices be generally fair and
equitable as applied to the sellers responsible for the major part
of the output of the commodity. As to such sellers it is the effect
of the maximum price upon their overall operations as business
units that must be considered." 35
Another very potent argument in support of the soundness of the
Administrator's interpretation of the Act is the fact that the industry
earnings standard was well suited to effectuation of the purposes of
the Act. Undoubtedly the prime purposes of the Act, at least in the
wartime period of price control, were those first enumerated: "to
stabilize prices and to prevent speculative, unwarranted, and abnormal
increases in prices and rents." 36 Under this standard, increases in
prices which must otherwise have taken place because of the operation
of speculative factors or because of increased demand and diminished
supply were prevented, while increases in prices due to war-induced
increases in costs were minimized by the principle of the industry
earnings standard of absorption of increased costs up to the level where
normal peacetime profits of the industry would be impaired.17
35. SEN. REP. No. 931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1942).
36. § 1 (a).
37. The alternative most vigorously urged by those outside the agency was that
proposed by Sen. Taft during the Senate Banking and Currency Committee Hearings
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There were at least two important affirmations of the propriety of
these pricing tests: The Emergency Court of Appeals upheld their
validity, and Congress clearly indicated its approval of the adminis-
trative interpretation of the Act. The question of the validity of
measuring prices in a multiple product industry against the industry
earnings and product standards was presented to the Emergency Court
of Appeals for the first time in Gillespie-Rogers-Pyatt Co. Inc, et al v.
Bowles3
8
The court pointed out that it was settled by the decisions of that
court that the mere showing of a cost increase in connection with a
particular commodity did not alone entitle the industry to an increase
in maximum price. Furthermore, it agreed with the Administrator
that the industry earnings standard was valid when applied to a multiple
product industry in conjunction with the application of the product
standard to the products dealt in by the industry. In support of its
position, the court pointed to the language of the Act. It also stressed
the important factor that the use of the two standards accorded with
normal business practices. The court said:
"It is a phenomenon of our peacetime economy that a multiple-
product industry which earns satisfactory profits on its over-all
operations frequently finds it necessary or desirable to sell one or
more items of its line of commodities at cost or even at a loss.
The Act does not compel changes in practices of this sort." 89
Congress indicated its approval of the administrative interpreta-
tion in 1944, when the Act was renewed without change in the pertinent
language. During the course of the hearings on the bill to renew the
Emergency Price Control Act and the Stdbilization Extension Act,
the standards used by the Administrator were carefully explained to
both the Senate and House Committees.4 ' Reference was made to
the standards in the report of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency.4 Furthermore, the matter came up in the debates on the
floor of the Senate.A
One further determination had to be made before the standards
could be applied, namely, the selection of a representative peacetime
period against which to measure current profits. In most instances,
the years 1936-1939 were used, although this period was not con-
to amend the Emergency Price Control Act, vis., that increases in costs should result
in increases in prices.
38. 144 F. 2d 361 (E. C. A. 1944).
39. Id. at 364.
40. Hearings, supra note 15, at 55-62; supra note 16, at 77-96.
41. SEN. REP. No. 922, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., Supp. Statement at 45-7 (1944).
42. See remarks of Sen. Taft, 90 Cong. Rec. 5683-6 (June 9, 1944).
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sidered representative in every instance." On occasion one or more
of these years was dropped out and at times another year was added
where, for reasons peculiar to the particular industry, another period
was considered more representative of normal peacetime experience.44
The Act itself left the choice of the period to the discretion of the
Administrator.45
2. On the basis of changes made in the Act
A variety of specific changes in regulations were required because
of Congressional amendments to the Act.
a. Amendment of 1943. The first of these, and one that stirred
up a great deal of controversy, was the addition of Section 2 (j) to
the Act, generally referred to as the "Taft" amendment.46 This sec-
tion limited the authority of the administrator in regard to: (1)
restricting trade and brand names, (2) requiring grade labeling, and
(3) fixing maximum prices based on standards and specifications..
OPA regulations had not, prior to the adoption of this section of
the Act, made any attempt to eliminate or restrict the use of estab-
lished trade or brand names. Accordingly no changes in regulations
were required because of this portion of the amendment.
47
But the Administrator had previously undertaken, early in 1943, to
include in the regulations applicable to many commodities the require-
ment that grade and quality information be given to buyers. Therefore,
compliance with paragraph 2 of section 2 (j) did require some changes
in regulations. The flat prohibition against requiring grade labeling
was interpreted by the Administrator to apply only to goods sold to
the normal, non-commercial consumer; only to markings on the goods
themselves or to tags attached to the goods; and only to non-descriptive
labels which contained an express judgment as to the comparative value
of the commodity for a special purpose.48  This left open the possibility
of substituting for former grade labeling requirements, requirements of
placing the grade on the invoice or bill of sale, or of descriptive labeling,
43. Hearings, supra note 16, at 1425.
44. Ibid.
45. Many considerations supported the selection of the years 1936-1939. They
were the years picked by Congress as a normal peacetime period for excess profits
tax purposes. They predate the war boom years and they were, for most industries,
representative. If a later period had been used, it would have favored those industries
which were first favorably affected by defense activities and would have discriminated
against those first unfavorably affected. See Hearings, supra note 16, at 1425-8.
46. Added by § 5(a). 57 STAT. 566 (1943), 50 U. S. C. 902 (Supp. 1945).
47. The amendment was, in all likelihood, prompted by the fact that the OPA
was, at that time, considering steps to curb evasive practices through the changing of
brand names. (Memorandum from Henry M. Hart, Jr., Associate General Counsel
of OPA to Prentiss M. Brown, Administrator, July 16, 1943.)
48. Memorandum of July 16, 1943, supra note 47.
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or of ceiling price labeling, where ceiling prices were established on the
basis of described grades. In most instances requiring changes be-
cause of this portion of the Taft amendment, one of these alternatives
was adopted. 9 In some instances, however, no one or more of these
alternatives was suitable and therefore the grade labeling requirement
was eliminated without substitution."°
The third and fourth clauses of section 2 (j), dealing with maxi-
mum prices based on specifications and standards raised the question of
whether clauses 3 and 4 were to be read alternatively so as to permit
maximum pricing on the basis of standards and specifications if the
requirements of either one of those clauses'were complied with, or
conjunctively so as to permit such maximum pricing only if the
requirements of both were met. The history of the legislation in-
dicated that the former interpretation was the correct one and the
Administrator was so advised by counsel." This interpretation was
adopted by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for
the Third Circuit in U. S. v. Pepper Bros.52 and by the Emergency
Court of Appeals in Avon Western Corp. v. Bowles " and in Thomas
Paper Stock Co. v. Bowles. 4 The interpretation, as contained in the
latter case, was affirmed by the Supreme Court.55
b. Amendments of the Stabilization Extension Act of 1944.
When the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and the Stabilization
act were extended by the Stabilization Extension Act of 1944,56 several
basic changes in the provisions of the acts were included.
1. Section 3 of the Stabilization Act. Among these changes was
that provided by an amendment, popularly known as the "Bankhead"
amendment, to section 3 of the Stabilization Act. That amendment
provided:
"On and after the date of the enactment of this paragraph,
it shall be unlawful to establish or maintain, any maximum price
49. Examples of regulations substituting requirement of grade on invoice or bill
of sale: Kraft wrapping paper, MPR 182, Amendment 8, 8 FED. REG. 10761 (1943);
Peanuts and peanut butter, RMPR. 335, Amendment 2, 8 FED. REG. 10987 (1943). Ex-
ample of regulations substituting descriptive labels: Anti-freeze, MPR 170, Amend-
ment 6, 8 FED. REG. 11437 (1943) ; Example of regulation substituting ceiling price
labelling: Utility shirts, RMPR 304, 8 FED. REG. 11063 (1943).
50. See, e. g., Bed linens, RPS 89, Amendment 11, 8 FED. REG. 11245 (1943) ; Rub-
ber heels, MPR 200, Amendment 11, 8 FED. REG. 10980 (1943).
51. 'Memorandum of July 16, 1943, supra note 47. See also statement of the Presi-
dent in signing the bill, referred to in the SEVENTH QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE OFFICE
OF PRICE ADMINISTRATION, submitted February 15, 1944, at 19.
52. 142 F. 2d 340, 343 (C. C. A. 3d 1944).
53. 145 F. 2d 473 (E. C. A. 1944).
54. 148 F. 2d 831 (E. C. A. 1945).
55. Thomas Paper Stock Co. v. Porter, 328 U. S. 50 (1946).
56. 58 STAT. 632, 50 U. S. C. 902 (Supp. 1945).
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for any agricultural commodity or any commodity processed or
manufactured in whole or substantial part from any agricultural
commodity which will reflect to the producers of such agricultural
commodity a price below the highest applicable price standard
(applied separately to each major item in the case of products
made in whole or major part from cotton or cotton yarn) of this
Act." 17 (Emphasis supplied).
Prior to this amendment, the pricing standard to assure the
reflection of parity to the grower had been applied to the industry as a
whole rather than separately to each major item of cotton products.
To assure immediate compliance with the amendment, the Adminis-
trator issued an adjustable pricing order which permitted producers
of certain cotton products (those for which the Administrator contem-
plated that increases would be necessary) to agree to deliver those
products at prices which could be adjusted upward after the time of
delivery. 8
The order took care of the emergency situation; within a week,
the Administrator issued the first of the adjusted prices."" Other
adjustments of a similar nature followed in short order.€0 All of the
early adjustments were labeled "interim" adjustments since, as was
pointed out in the Statement of Considerations accompanying Amend-
ment 20 to Revised Price Schedule 35, "the Office of Price Adminis-
tration has not attempted to reach a final determination as to the
lowest ceiling which would comply with the statute. Instead, it has
tentatively adopted a working rule which will assure that ceiling prices
are safely above the statutory minimum." "
The working rule which was adopted for computing a maximum
price for a major item made reference to the following four factors; a
landed-mill parity equivalent for the cotton used in the basic item of
the major item; a weighted average of mill conversion costs; a
margin, representative of the average profit in cents per yard enjoyed
by producers of themajor item in a normal peace-time period, normally
1936-1939; and an amount equivalent, in cost of cotton in the cloth, to
2 points in the parity index or Y cent per pound of raw cotton.6 2 This
was known as the "major item net worth" formula.
57. Id. § 201 (a).
58. Supp. Ord. 92, 9 FED. REG. 7502 (1944).
59. RPS 35, Amendment 20, 9 FED. REG. 7700 (1944), effective June 30, 1944.
60. E. g., RPS 35, Amendments 21 and 23, 9 FED. REG. 9278 and 9 FED. REG. 10088
(1944) ; RPS 7, Amendment 14, 9 FED. REG. 10636 (1944) ; RPS 89, Amendment 13,
9 FED. REG. 9616 (1944).
61. OPA SERVICE, CONSUmER GOODS DESK Boox, 3349.
62. Although the Administrator announced that he felt that without the last factor
prices would be more than adequate to meet the new standard, for purposes of com-
puting a tentative price the two point allowance was thought warranted. It was looked
upon not as a margin of safety for any single element in the price, but rather as a
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One of the main reasons that the price increases first issued were
considered tentative was due to the lack of up to date cost information.
After the completion of a cost survey, it became possible to issue
"definitive" prices which represented, at the time,6" prices which ac-
corded with the new pricing requirements of the Act. The first of
these was issued five months after the "Bankhead" amendment became
effective.64
The formula used in setting "definitive" prices not only was ap-
plied in the light of new data as to costs, but it also varied in one major
respect65 from that used earlier. In lieu of a margin representative of
the average profit in cents per yard enjoyed in 1936-1939, the new
formula used as a profit factor an amount intended to yield the same
return on net worth as producers enjoyed from the major item in
1936-1939.66 It was contemplated that this change would restrict,
legally, the amount of the increase and would also more closely accord
with standards used for other commodities.67
Not long after "definitive" prices giving effect to the changes
necessitated by the "Bankhead" amendment were established for a great
many major items, extensive wage increases in many textile mills were
authorized by the War Labor Board and it appeared likely that many
other mills would shortly be paying the same increases. This brought
to the fore the question whether the "major item net worth formula"
outlined above had to be applied in determining whether the maximum
price for a major item continued to meet the standards of the Act or
whether it would be sufficient, after making an initial adjustment on
that basis, to revert to the usual industry earnings standard or some
other modification of that standard, less inflationary than the major
item standard, for purposes of maintaining (rather than establishing)
prices under the "Bankhead" amendment.
After due consideration the Administrator first determined that
he would be satisfying the standards of the Act if he completed setting
"definitive" prices on the basis previously outlined and thereafter in-
creased prices for new increases in costs only when required by the
industry earnings standard, provided that, as to any major item, the
tolerance of general applicability. Statement of Considerations Accompanying Amend-
ment 21 to RPS 35, OPA SERwvC, CONSUMR GOODS DEski BooK, 3350.
63. As explained in a footnote to Statement of Considerations Accompanying
Amendment 25 to MPR 118, OPA SERIvcE, CONSUM-ER GooDs DEsK Boor at 3779,
"definitive" does not mean not subject to adjustment when necessary.
64. MPR 118, Amendment 25, 9 FED. REG. 14211 (1944).
65. It should be noted that the "parity cushion" of Y44 per pound was maintained
in the permanent formula.
66. Statement of Considerations, supra note 63.
67. For an extended discussion of these problems, see memorandum on "Policy
Issues in Pricing of Major Cotton Textile Products," appended to Statement of Con-
siderations, supra note 63, at 3780.
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ceiling price covered at least the industry's total costs of making and
selling the product, (including general administrative overhead and
selling expenses), which, in itself, is a standard considerably more
liberal than the product standard applied in other industries.6
The announcement of this standard, however, aroused consider-
able Congressional opposition, and the Administrator was informed
that the Committee on Banking and Currency felt that it would not
satisfy the purposes of the amendment. 9 Accordingly, late in June
1945, the Administrator announced that after further consideration, he
was abandoning his previously announced policy regarding maintaining
prices under the "Bankhead" amendment and would use thereafter his
major item net worth standard in maintaining as well as in estab-
lishing prices.
Under the newly readopted standard, the Administrator con-
templated that, as to certain items, price rises due to increased labor
costs would be inevitable. To prevent a production slowdown pend-
ing final announcement of the adjustments, recourse was once more had
to the adjustable pricing order permitting certain producers to enter
into contracts which provided for limited aatjustments in prices after
the increases were announced.70  However, within a short time, sub-
stantial extension had to be provided71 because the flow of goods to
market had almost stopped.72 The industry was aware that, on the
basis required by Congress, the increases would be considerable, and
it was unwilling, in the interim period, to forego any profit, however
unwarranted and out of line with profits in other industries. By late
August, 1945, the first of the new increases were announced. 73
2. Highest Price Line Limitation. Section 2 (k) of the Emer-
gency Price Control Act was added by the 1944 extension.74 It
provided:
68. Hearings, supra note 29, at 597.
69. Statement of Considerations Accompanying Supp. Ord. 114, OPA SERVICE,
GExERAL DExs Boox, 9295.
70. Supp. Ord. 114, 10 FED. REG. 7528 (1945).
71. Rev. Supp. Ord. 114, 10 FED. REG. 9875 (1945).
72. Statement of Considerations Accompanying Rev. Supp. Ord. 114, OPA SERv-
IcE, supra note 69, at 9298.
73. Supp. Ord. 131, 10 FED. REG. 11296 (1945). The prices under this order were
higher because the parity price of cotton had advanced between June 1944 and
July 1945, and because of increased labor costs. In establishing these prices, the
Administrator adopted a method little used in the Textile field prior thereto, i. e., a
two band system of pricing. In order to establish prices that met the requirements of
the amendment without giving some producers a more unwarranted windfall than
legally and administratively necessary, the Administrator felt compelled to compute
the weighted average conversion costs separately for those mills paying increased wages
and for those mills not paying those increases.
74. Section 102 of the Stabilization Extension Act of 1944, supra note 56.
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"No regulation, order, or price schedule issued under this
Act shall, after the effective date of this subsection, require any
seller of goods at retail to limit his sales with reference to any
highest price line offered for sale by him at any prior time."
Prior to the amendment, several regulations contained such limita-
tions, i. e., "highest price line" limitations, for both retail and pre-
retail sales; " such regulations prohibited a seller from selling any
commodity or special class of a commodity at a price higher than the
maximum price at which he had sold that commodity or special class
of commodity during a specified base period. Such limitations had
been imposed in order to halt the inflationary practice of "trading up,"
i. e., the movement of sellers into higher price lines of merchandise and
the dropping of lower price lines. This "trading up" was particularly
troublesome in the apparel fields where higher costs frequently did not
result in a more durable or useful article. The Emergency Court of
Appeals subsequently affirmed the validity of the Administrator's
limitation."6
After the addition of Section 2 (k) to the Act, the limitation
placed on the Administrator's powers was only on his ability to impose
a "highest price line" limitation on sales at retail. The language of the
Act is clear on that point and the Emergency Court of Appeals so
held. To carry out the purpose of the amended Act, Supplementary
Order 93 was issued.7 7  This order deleted such limitations on retail
prices from all regulations and orders which at that time contained
them. That was the only action legally required of the Administrator,
although in certain instances highest price line limitations at other
levels were also deleted because of administrative difficulty of enforce-
ment where a correlative limitation was not permitted at the retail
level.
7 8
3. Crop Disaster Requirement. Another change in the pricing
standards was that necessitated by the addition of Section 3 (g) to the
Emergency Price Control Act,7" which provided for adjustments in
the maximum prices for fresh fruits and vegetables to make allowance
for
"substantial reductions in merchantable crop yields, unusual in-
creases in costs of production, and other factors which result from
75. E. g., Women's Fur Garments, MPR 178; Men's and Boys' Tailored Clothing,
MPR 177.
76. See Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Bowles, 147 F. 2d 858, 861 (E. C. A.
1945) ; Ebling Brewing Co., Inc. v. Porter, 156 F. 2d 1012 (E. C. A. 1945) ; cert.
denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 297 (1946).
77. 9 FED. REG. 7574 (1944).
78. See, e. g., Statement of Considerations Accompanying Revised Maximum Price
Regulation (RMPR) 330, OPA SERViCE, supra note 61, at 28331.
79. Added by § 103 (b) of the Stabilization Extension Act of 1944, supra note 56.
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hazards occurring in connection with the production and market-
ing of such commodity."
In view of the legislative history of this amendment, the Adminis-
trator announced that he interpreted it to require growers to be given
the opportunity to recoup losses much as they would be able to do in
a normal peace-time market. At the same time it was pointed out that
the Administrator had attempted so to act prior to the amendment.8"
Amendments to Revised Maximum Price Regulation 271 ". and
to Maximum Price Regulation 426 2 are mute but vivid evidence of
the effect of this amendment on growers' prices. Most of the ad-
justments were increases for lowered merchantable crop yield. Such
factors as drought, 3 coddling moths, 4 unseasonably cold weather,"5
hurricane, 6 blight, 7 all had to be considered. But bad weather could
not only decrease crop yield, but might also be the cause of "unusual
increases in costs of production" by increasing labor or shipping
expenses, 8 or of other decreases in the value of the resulting crop such
as by lowering the quality. 0 In such cases increases to compensate
were required, or other action was essential."
The adjustments required by this section were extremely numer-
ous, so much so, in fact, that in October of 1944, a change also had to be
made in the method computing the price of intermediate sellers.
Previously they had compted their prices once weekly. But because,
as the Administrator explained, it was necessary frequently to adjust
growers prices on short notice, intermediate sellers were thereafter
permitted to compute maximum prices on each lot.91
c. Amendments made by the 1945 Extension. The act extending
the Emergency Price Control Act and the Stabilization Act until June
30, 1946 92 required only two changes in the pricing standards. Sec-
80. Opinion of the Administrator accompanying order denying protest: S. A. Ger-
rard Co., No. 1271-8-P (Dec. 28, 1945), OPA Service, 3 Oct. & Dec. 706, 708 (1945).
81. Amendment 18, 9 FED. REG. 7771 (1944), effective July 15, 1944, was the first
to provide a necessary increase.
82. Amendment 44, 9 FED. REG. 9090 (1944), effective July 27, 1944, was the first
under this regulation.
83. RMPR 271, Amendment 19, 9 FED. REG. 9356 (1944).
84. MPR 426, Amendment 56, 9 FED. REG. 11350 (1944).
85. MPR 426, Amendment 79, 10 FED. REG. 460 (1945).
86. MPR 426, Amendment 89, 10 FED. REG. 2188 (1945).
87. RMPR 271, Amendment 31, 10 FED. REG. 2969 (1945).
88. MPR 426, Amendment 180, 11 FED. REG. 5737 (1946); MPR 426, Amendment
44, 9 FED. REG. 9090 (1944).
89. MPR 426, Amendment 73, 9 FED. REG. 13995 (1944); MPR 426, Amendment
44, 9 FED. REG. 9090 (1944).
90. Administrative difficulties sometimes made an increase impracticable. In such
a case, to comply with the law, the Administrator could suspend price control on the
commodity, as was done in the case of cabbages in early September 1944. MPR 426,
Amendment 56, 9 FED. REG. 11350 (1944).
91. RMPR 271, Amendment 25, 9 FED. REG. 12270 (1944).
92. 59 STAT. 306 (1945), 50 U. S. C. §§ 901-946 (Supp. 1946).
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tion 4 of the 1945 extension " required the Administrator to permit a
seller who normally made a uniform charge for c. o. d. mail deliveries
to add to his maximum price the amount of any increase in postal
rates, a minor matter.
Section 7 of the 1945 extension,94 popularly referred to as the
Barkley-Bates amendment, provided for a new standard in establishing
maximum prices in the meat processing industry. The story of this
industry under the Act has been told elsewhere. 5
B. DISCRETIONARY ACTIONS
The main type of discretionary action taken by the OPA was a
discretionary increase in a maximum price, i. e., an increase in excess
of that required because of the minimum standards. Less frequent
types of discretionary actions were certain decreases in prices which,
while technically "required" by the Act and the Executive Orders,
actually were discretionary with the Administrator, as a practical
matter.
The Emergency Price Control Act, the Stabilization Act, and
two Executive Orders, 9250 96 and 9328 17 each had a bearing on the
powers of the Administrator to take various discretionary actions. As
indicated previously, the original Act laid down certain mandatory
requirements to be developed and applied by the Administrator in
establishing and maintaining maximum prices. Under the original
Act, the Administrator might properly have found, either initially or
upon application for a price increase, that it would effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act to establish maximum prices for a commodity at a level
higher than the minimum which could be defended upon protest as
generally fair and equitable. Upon making such a finding he had a
discretionary authority to establish maximum prices at the higher
level. And in some instances the Administrator actually exercised that
power.98
Executive Order 9250,"9 issued under the Stabilization Act, placed
new limitations upon the discretionary authority of the Price Admin-
istrator to permit price increases on commodities affecting the cost of
living, although it theoretically left untouched the Administrator's dis-
93. 59 STAT. 307 (1945), 50 U. S. C. § 902(n) (Supp. 1946) was added to the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.
94. A further proviso was added to § 3 of the Stabilization Act of 1942 by 59 STAT.
309, 50 U. S. C. § 963 (Supp. 1946).
95. Nathanson and Hyman, Judicial Review of Price Control: The Battle of Meat
Regulations, 42 ILL. L. REv. 584 (1947).
96. 7 FED. REG. 7871 (1942).
97. 8 FED. REG. 4681 (1943).
98. See, e. g., MPR 167, Amendment 2, 7 FED. REG. 7403 (1942).
99. See note 96 supra. The Price Administrator's authority to carry out the poli-
cies of the Stabilization Act insofar as they affected prices was made subject to the
policy directives of the Director of Economic Stabilization.
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cretionary power where the cost of living would not be affected. 00
As to cost of living commodities, price increases above the minimum
required by law were confined to cases in which the increases were
found necessary either to correct gross inequities or to aid in the
effective prosecution of the war. The guiding policy of all departments
and agencies of the government was the stabilization of the cost of
living at September 15, 1942 levels. Under these standards the Ad-
ministrator granted some, but not many, increases. 1°1
Executive Order 9328, issued April 8, 1943, set up even more
rigorous standards, That order directed the Price Administrator to
"authorize no further increases in ceiling prices except to the minimum
extent required by law." An exception was found later in the order,
however, which provided:
"Nothing herein, however, shall be construed to prevent...
the Price Administrator, subject to the general policy directives
of the Economic Stabilization Director, from making such read-
justments in price relationships appropriate for various com-
modities . . provided that such action does not increase the
cost of living."
Thus after April 8, 1943, the Price Administrator was left with
power to grant an increase in price above minimum levels only if such
an increase would aid in the effective prosecution of the war or would
correct a gross inequity, and only if such action did not affect the cost
of living. If a proposed increase did not meet the latter requirement,
but did fall within the former category, it could become effective only
after approval by the Director of Economic Stabilization. This limited
discretionary power set-up was maintained all during the continuance
of the war; it was formally changed only by the issuance of Executive
Order 9599,"02 in August 1945.
1. Increases Without Approval of the Director of Economic
Stabilization
Whenever the Administrator found that a proposed increase would
not increase the cost of living, he could proceed without OES (Office
of Economic Stabilization) approval.' 3 One large category of cases
100. Theoretically, at least, the Administrator had complete discretion to increase
prices not affecting the cost of living. In fact, however, that unlimited power was not
used; the same standards were applied to cost of living and non-cost of living com-
modities, in order to avoid the charge of discrimination. Hearings, supra note 15, at
1995.
101. See, e. g., MPR 280, Amendment 11, 8 FED. REG. 1885 (1943); MPR 285,
Amendment 2, 8 FED. REG. 3050 (1943) ; MPR 11, 8 FED. REG. 361 (1943).
102. 10 FED. REG. 10155 (1945). The changes made by this order will be dis-
cussed under Section III infra.
103. Implicit in the entire discussion of necessity for OES approval or lack
thereof, is the assumption that the proposed increase, in the Price Administrator's
opinion, meets the other requirements of the Act and order.
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where that was done was where the commodity did not affect the cost
of living, such as a commodity used solely for military purposes or sold
only to war procurement agencies. °'0
The other main category of cases was where the commodity
affected the cost of living, but where the particular price increase
action, for one of many reasons, did not increase the cost of living. For
example, where an increase at one level of distribution did not neces-
sitate an increase in the retailer's price, the cost of living was not
increased. Thus an increase in raw material cost which was to be
absorbed by the manufacturer o or processor, 06 or an increase in the
cost of consumer goods which was to be absorbed by distributors 107
did not increase the cost of living. During this period, i. e., during
the prosecution of the war, a large proportion of the increases per-
mitted without OES approval were made on the basis of absorption
somewhere before goods reached the consumer.
In other situations, an increase was not deemed to increase the
cost of living although it was in increase in the price of consumer
goods. The increase may have been deemed infinitesimal; '0' or it
may have been part of a readjustment of prices taking the form of an
increase in one case accompanied by a decrease in another related
price.'09
One of the most interesting reconciliations used by the Adminis-
trator involved the granting of increases for low priced merchandise.
The Administrator had reason to believe, in many instances, that un-
less an increase were granted either to a particular seller 110 or for a
particular low priced product,"' the seller would go out of business
or he would cease making the inexpensive product. In such a case, if
the consumer would have had to buy from another seller having a
higher price for the same product, or if the commodity which could
have been substituted would have cost more without giving propor-
tionately increased value, the Administrator reasoned that the grant-
104. See, e. g., MPR 537, Amendment 1, 10 FED. REG. 412 (1945); MPR 118,
Amendment 26, 9 FED. REG. 14383 (1944); MPR 443, 8 FED. REG. 10759 (1943);
RPS 7, Amendment 10, 8 FED. PEG. 5755 (1943).
105. E. g., MPR 231, Amendment 3, 9 FED. REG. 7710 (1944).
106. E. g., MPR 573, 10 FED. REG. 1148 (1945) ; MPR 531, Amendment 4, 10
FED. REG. 117 (1945) ; MPR 357, Amendment 1, 9 FED. EG. 1905 (1944).
107. E. g., RMPR 289, Amendment 22, 10 FED. REG. 2928 (1945); MPR 496,
Amendment 8, 10 FED. PEG. 2160 (1945).
108. E. g., MPR 33, Amendment 5, 8 FED. EG. 13497 (1943). This involved an
increase in the price of bag closing twine.
109. E. g., RPS 60, Amendment 12, 9 FED. PEG. 10707 (1944); MPR 11, Amend-
ment 7, 8 FED. PEG. 8937 (1943).
110. E. g., Supp. Reg. 14C, Amendment 7, 10 FED. PEG. 9010 (1945) ; Supp. Reg.
15, Amendment 40, 10 FED. PEG. 6766 (1945) ; MPR 391, Amendment 5, 10 FED. PEG.
4542 (1945).
111. E. g., RMPR 289, Amendment 29, 10 FED. PEG. 6232 (1945) ; RMPR 301,
10 FED. PEG. 4150 (1945) ; RMPR 300, 10 FED. PEG. 4140 (1945) ; Food Products
Reg. (FPR) 1, Amendment 2 to Supp. 3, 10 FED. PEG. 3554 (1945).
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ing of the increase would not increase the cost of living since without
the increase the consumer would have to pay at least as much or more
for another product or to another seller." 2  Reference was had to this
rationale normally only where it was desirable to maintain production
of the comnlodity affected.
2. Increases Under the "Supply Standard"-With OES Approval
In November 1943, the Director of Economic Stabilization issued
a general directive outlining the conditions under which price increases
beyond the minimum required by law and which increased the cost of
living would be approved." 3 It had to be shown that:
(1) The War Production Board had established production
controls, normally on the lower priced items, which required the
manufacture of specified items.
(2) The War Production Board had found that ceiling
prices constituted a serious impediment to effectuation of produc-
tion programs to meet civilian needs.
(3) The price increase did not afford more than total cost,
except that if the overall operations were not extremely profitable,
a small profit could be allowed.
This program was made necessary because in many instances a
multiple product industry whose overall profit position was good
(judged by the standards set up for determining general fairness and
equity) or even a single-line industry which made both low and high
priced lines, -found it more profitable to discontinue less profitable or
loss items (normally the lower priced items) and turn its productive
capacity over to more profitable items (normally higher priced items).
Demand being large, such action was frequently possible. 4
In the administration of this policy, the textile," 5 apparel,"' and
consumer goods 117 industries were those mainly affected. The normal
112. Compare related reasoning: RMPR 271, Amendment 37, 10 FED. REG. 5457
(1945) ; MPR 425, Amendment 4, 8 FED. REG. 16293 (1943) ; MPR 306, Amendment
16, 8 FED. REG. 12791 (1943).
113. The directive was contained in a letter to the Price Administrator, dated
November 16, 1943. The program outlined in the letter is found in the Statement of
Considerations Accompanying RPS 89, Amendment 12, OPA SERVICE, CONSUMER
GooDs DESK BooK, 3539-40.
114. Other attempts to minimize such action, i. e., concentration on higher priced
items, were Maximum Average Price Regulations, Supp. Ord. 108, 110, and 113, 10
FED. REG. 4336, 5404, and 6762 (1945). These orders required, in general, that the
average selling price of all commodities, or groups of commodities, sold not exceed
a base period average selling price.
115. E. g., Supp. Ord. 86, 9 FED. REG. 3734 (1944) ; Supp. Ord. 86, Amendment 2,
10 FED. REG. 9430 (1945) ; RPS 89, Amendment 12, 9 FED. REG. 1717 (1944).
116. E. g., Supp. Ord. 99, Amendment 1, 10 FED. REG. 199 (1945); Supp. Ord.
99, Amendment 2, 10 FED. REa. 2080 (1945); Supp. Ord. 86, Amendment 1, 10 FED.
REG. 1607 (1945) ; MPR 578, 10 FED. REG. 2388 (1945) ; RMPR 304, Amendment 1,
10 FED. REG. 5039 (1945).
117. E. g., MPR 188, Order A-2, Amendment 20, 9 FED. REG. 14394 (1944).
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procedure, under this so-called "supply standard," was to allow total
unit cost or 102% of such cost, depending upon the profit situation of
the individuals concerned. 118
III. THE TRANSITION PERIOD
The transition period, i. e., the period during which industry was
converting from a wartime to a peacetime basis, overlaps in part the
period just discussed, i. e., the wartime period. For some purposes,
the transition period may be said to begin early in May 1945, i. e.,
after V-E Day. It was at that time that the Administrator announced
the new transition objectives and proposed means of obtaining them.,"9
He also set forth, at that time, what he conceived to be the special
price control problems of the transition period: (1) Problems of en-
couraging necessary production by industries that had been making
peacetime commodities throughout the war; (2) problems of encourag-
ing production by industries that had converted entirely or almost
entirely to war goods; (3) problems of encouraging low end produc-
tion by all manufacturers i. e., production of low rather than high price
lines of an item; and (4) problems of decontrol.
The policies to be pursued during the transition period were
formalized in Executive Order 9599; 120 the Administrator was to set
about adjusting prices so that they would not interfere with the effective
transition to a peacetime economy. He also was to attempt to see
that, insofar as possible, these increases did not cause increases at later
levels of production and distribution.
During this period, 2' three major standards, two of them new,
were applied in determining whether a discretionary increase over and
above any required by the minimum standards of the act should be
granted. These were:
(1) the transition product standard
(2) the reconversion standard
(3) the supply standard.
118. Supp. Ord. 86, 9 FED. REG. 3734 (1944).
119. OPA Release No. 5566, May 11, 1945. Plans had been made as early as the
3rd quarter of 1944. See ELEVENTH QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF PRICE AD-
MINISTRATION 5-7 (February 5, 1945).
120. 10 FED. REG. 10155 (1945).
121. Several executive orders made changes in the legal standards applicable dur-
ing this period. See Exec. Order 9599, 10 FED. REG. 10155 (1945) (returned to Ad-
ministrator powers over price increases previously transferred to Economic Stabiliza-
tion Director) ; Exec. Order 9651, 10 FED. REG. 13487 (1945) (provided a six-month
test period wherein an increase unapproved by the appropriate wage stabilization
agency could not be considered by OPA in determining whether a price increase should
be made) ; Exec. Order 9697, 11 FED. REG. 1691 (1946) (required Administrator to
adjust price ceilings where an industry was found to be in hardship due to wage
increases, and consider future earnings prospects).
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Along with all of these, a policy of cost absorption by distributors, to
the fullest extent possible, was applied.
A. The Transition Product Standard
During the war, the OPA had used two standards for determin-
ing the extent to which increases in ceiling prices should be granted
for particular products where the overall industry position was good:
the product and supply standards.' These standards continued in
use in the transition period, although the product standard was used
to an ever decreasing extent.'23  In order to relax somewhat the strict
wartime standards in an effort to encourage production, the transition
product standard was evolved.
Under the transition product standard, the ceiling price or prices
of a particular product produced by a multi-product manufacturing
industry were raised to the extent necessary to return to the industry,
on the average, the total costs of making and selling the product.2 4
The early actions wherein this new standard was used were cases
where the product on which the adjustment was granted was im-
portant for the peacetime economy 125 and normally where the con-
sumer of th6 product would have had to substitute a more expensive
item, 26 but where it was not found, obviously because it could not
be, that the essentiality of the product was such that it met the stringent
requirements of the supply standard. The reasonableness of the exten-
sion is readily apparent in such cases. Later the standard was extended
and developed further until it became accepted as a substitute for the
product standard in almost all situations1
2 7
In order to keep as many manufacturers as possible in business
during the transition period, a standard for individual adjustments far
more liberal than that used during the war was developed.2 In
September 1945, Supp. Ord. 133 was issued. 29 It provided that manu-
facturers could qualify for adjustment if their overall operations had
been conducted at a loss during the most recent accounting period,
or where a projection of operations showed, on the basis of known
122. Supra, pp. 507-510.
123. SEVENTEENTH QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF PRICE ADmNISTRATIo,
11 (July 17, 1946).
124. See, e. g., MPR 244, Amendment 10, 10 FED. REG. 11710 (1945) ; Supp. Reg.
14G, Amendment 3, 10 FED. REG. 15377 (1945) ; Supp. Reg. 14G, Amendment 4, 11
FED. REG. 3259 (1946) ; MPR 149, Amendment 26, 11 FED. REG. 3530 (1945).
125. RPS 32, Amendments 22 and 23, 10 FED. REG. 9102, 12262 (1945); Supp.
Reg. 14G, Amendments 3 and 4, 10 FED. REG. 15377 (1945), 11 FED. REG. 3259 (1946).
126. MPR 244, Amendment 10, 10 FED. REG. 11710 (1945) ; RPS 40, Amendment
6, 10 FED. REG. 12650 (1945) ; MPR 413, Amendment 4, 10 FED. REG. 12689 (1945).
127. See SEVENTEENTH QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 123, at 11-12.
128. During the war, the provisions for individual hardship adjustments normally
permitted increases only where the individual's production was essential to the war-
time economy.
129. 10 FED. REG. 11658 (1945).
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costs, that the manufacturer would immediately be operating his over-
all business at a loss. 130
B. The Reconversion Standard
Inasmuch as the transition period was a time when many manu-
facturers were resuming and enlarging production of civilian goods,
it was necessary to adopt a price policy which would, at once facilitate
reconversion, thereby fostering employment and the expansion of
civilian production, and at the same time prevent unnecessary price
increases . 1  The previously established bases for determining the
necessity for and the size of an adjustment were not feasible in such
cases. Normally, an adjustment was based upon ascertainable cost
figures of recent operating experience. As to reconverting manu-
facturers, however, no statistics were available upon which a justifiable
revision of prices could be based. Accordingly, as explained in a
press release,'32 the Administrator had a choice: estimating the increase
necessary to correctly adjust established maximum prices, making no
adjustment until the industry could submit current cost figures, or
developing a special formula for reconverting industries designed to
meet the special problems involved.
The agency ruled out the first two alternatives as unworkable and
set out to develop criteria whereby it could be determined, in advance
of actual operating experience, whether adjustments were necessary
in order not to deter reconversion. The purposes to be achieved were
explained, by the Administrator, as follows:
"The standards of adjustment . should be directed to
achieving a price for the applicant which would assure him the
prospect of profitable production once the temporary dislocations
which accompany the return under war conditions to the manu-
facture and sale of a discontinued or curtailed product had come
to an end. The standards should not, however, attempt to cover
the temporary cost increases. . . ." "s
The original formal outline of the reconversion formula was set
forth in Amendment 67 to Maximum Price Regulation 188.' It
closely followed the policy previously outlined and was approved by
130. Supp. Ord. 133, Amendment 2, 11 FED. REG. 3528 (1946).
131. From time to time before the end of the war in Europe the agency had been
faced with isolated instances of goods returning to production. However, no distinc-
tion was made between setting a price for a reconversion article and setting a price
for any other article. See, MPR 188, Order 1298, 9 FED. REG. 2311 (1944) ; RSR 14,
Amendments 157 and 165, 9 FED. REG. 9620, 10050 (1944) ; MPR 188, Order 2525 and
Amendment 1 to that Order, 9 FED. REG. 12306 (1944) and 10 FED. REG. 2460 (1944).
132. OPA Release No. 5566, May 11, 1945.
133. Statement of Considerations Accompanying Supp. Ord. 119, OPA SERVICE,
supra note 69, at 9345.
134. 10 FED. REG. 10972 (1945).
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the Economic Stabilization Director.13  The new standard overcame
the objections to estimating operating costs, while nonetheless per-
mitting adjustments. Stated generally, it provided for determining
the size of material and labor increases since a base period (normally
Oct. 1941) and for adjusting the base period prices to reflect those
increases as well as the industry average profit during the 1936-1939
period.'36 The formula also provided a method of treating reconvert-
ing manufacturers in accord with the treatment accorded industries
which had remained in production of civilian goods.3
Certain principles were basic to the formula:
(1) It was based on the assumption that volume production of
reconversion goods would be attained in a short period of time. It
was specifically provided that if sufficient volume was not attained, the
amount of the adjustment would be reconsidered.
1 8
(2) In order to avoid temporarily inflated material costs, only
changes in the level of material prices were considered.13 9  Thus
temporary increases due to changes in suppliers or increased freight
costs were avoided.
(3) Because it was felt that many factors which increased the
price of an hour's labor during wartime; such as overtime, multiple
shift premiums, increased vacations, and upgrading were due to the
manpower shortage of the wartime period, only changes in the basic
wage rate schedules were taken into account. The latter changes did,
of course, account for the major component of the increase in the price
of an hour's labor during the reconversion period.
(4) A profit factor equal to the average industry percentage of
profit in a representative peacetime period was included in the adjust-
ment. In the case of industry wide adjustments, the actual average
was used. When individual adjustments were concerned, such as
under Supplementary Orders 118 140 and 119,141 variations were pro-
vided; on the whole, however, they provided for the industry average.
In the main the period 1936-1939 was considered a representative
135. Directive 78, 10 FED. REG. 11074 (1945).
136. The actual mechanics of the formula, in most instances, involved the estab-
lishment of an industry increase factor which was applied either to base period prices
or to last established ceiling prices.
137. Statement of Considerations Accompanying Avnendment 67 to MPR, OPA
SERVICE, supra note 69.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid.
140. Under Supp. Ord. 118, 10 FED. REG. 9011 (1945) manufacturers were author-
ized to take their own average 1936-1939 profit margins if they wished. Statement of
Considerations Accompanying Supp. Ord. 118, OPA SERVICE, supra note 69, at 9335.
141. Under Supp. Ord. 119, 10 FED. REG. 9014 (1945), which dealt with individual
adjustments for another category of small manufacturers, the profit factor was equal
to one-half the industry average profit over cost in 1936-1939.
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period, and preferable to 1941 "in part because price increases and the
rapid expansion in volume combined in that year to inflate profit
margins and in part because. . . the Office has utilized the 1936-1939
period as the normal base for its industry earnings standard." 142 The
fact that the same base period was used for the formula and for the
industry earnings standard does not indicate that the profit basis was
in all other respects similar. As was carefully pointed out,14 "since the
profit element in the formula is a percentage of cost or expressed
alternatively, a percentage of sales, it does not confine manufacturers
to the aggregate dollar profits or rate of return on investment earned
on the average in 1936-1939. If the margin allowed is actually
realized, aggregate dollar profits will substantially exceed those earned
in 1936-1939 whenever the dollar volume of sales exceeds that of
1936-1939."
(5) From the foregoing, it can be seen that the formula did not
attempt to take into account all of the factors which had affected pro-
duction costs since 1941. It ignored some factors that increased costs,
but similarly ignored others which decreased costs, such as the un-
precedented ease of selling and the effect of technological progress
which most industries were bound to experience. 144
The reconversion pricing formula contemplated one industry-wide
adjustment wherever possible. In general such adjustments did form
the base of the structure,'45 with revision, where necessary, also on an
industry wide basis. 46 In certain circumstances, however, it was
contemplated that individual adjustments for the whole industry would
be the only method administratively possible. For example, where an
industry was dominated by one or more large, highly integrated firms,
individual adjustments were deemed necessary. In such a case, an
average of the materials' cost increase experience of both the integrated
and the non-integrated firms was likely to have proven an unsatis-
factory guide to the pricing needs of both groups.'4 "
Even before the formal outlines of the overall reconversion pricing
formula were announced, it was recognized that special provision for
142. Statement of Considerations, supra note 137.
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
145. Typical of the industry-wide adjustments were the following: MPR 188, Or-
ders 1-6 under Sec. 1499.159(e), 10 FED. REG. 11329, 12787, 13704 (1945) ; MPR 599,
10 FED. REG. 13522 (1945).
146. In some instances later experience showed the need for additional adjustment
upward. For example: RMPR 136, Order 572, Amendment 2, 11 FED. REG. 4633
(1946).
147. Perhaps the most notable use of individual adjustments on an industry-wide
basis occurred in connection with the automobile industry: MPR 594, 10 FED. REG.
11296 (1945).
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individual hardship cases would have to be provided. 14  Supple-
mentary Orders 118 and 119 were issued to establish the overall frame-
work for such individual adjustments. These two orders followed the
general policies, adapted to the particular needs they were designed to
meet.
149
Experience gained through using the formula, and later changes
in conditions suggested various relatively minor modifications of the
formula. For example, the Price Administrator was directed,'5 ° in
determining maximum prices under the reconversion pricing formula,
to disregard any increase in legal prices of materials authorized or
occurring after Nov. 27, 1945, and any approved increases in wage or
salary rates made after that date.' An exception was made of course,
where the Price Administrator found that the reflection of such in-
creases was necessary to maintain generally fair and equitable prices,
or to prevent hardships impeding reconversion. But, as the Adminis-
trator pointed out:
"Since the reconversion pricing formula provides for adjust-
ing ceilings above the minimum level required by law, exceptions
to the directive can be based only on the prevention of hardship
impeding reconversion." 152
However, when in the early part of 1946, wage increases were
obtained in many industries following the settlement of the steel strike,
the Administrator was directed by Executive Order 9697 to increase
ceilings in industries having recently approved wage increases, to the
extent necessary to allow the realization of the 1936-1939 rate of
profit during the ensuing twelve months. However, an exception was
made for industries operating at a temporarily low volume. The
Executive Order directed the Administrator to develop special stand-
ards in such cases. Such special standards had, in effect, been in
existence prior to the issuance of the order, pursuant to the terms of
Directive 88. In issuing Amendment 3 to Revised Order 4 to Maxi-
mum Price Regulation 594,153 the Administrator announced that, in
his opinion, the existing reconversion pricing standards complied with
the order. 4 In shbrt, the Administrator planned to continue to permit
148. Statement of Considerations Accompanying Supp. Ord. 119, supra note 133.
149. See notes 140, 141.
150. Directive No. 88, Office of Stabilization Director, OWMR, 10 FED. REG.
14574 (1945).
151. Unapproved increases were, by Exec. Ord. 9599, to be disregarded in any
event.
152. Statement of Considerations Accompanying Rev. Supp. Ord. 119, OPA
SERVIcE, supra note 133, at 9348E.
153. 11 FED. REG. 3495 (1946).
154. Statement of Considerations Accompanying Amendment 3 to Rev. Ord. 4 to
MPR 594, OPA SERVICE, METALS AND MACHINERY DESI BooK, at 81752.
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increases above the reconversion formula adjustments in cases where
such increases were necessary to maintain generally fair and equitable
prices or to prevent hardships impeding reconversion. It was con-
templated that in most instances an increase in labor costs without a
corresponding increase in maximum price would impose a hardship
impeding reconversion and therefore in most instances increases were
granted.5 5 In certain special cases, however, it was felt that increases
could be avoided.'
C. The Supply Standard-Maintenance of Low-End Production
In an inflationary market, there is substantial inducement to manu-
facturers to concentrate their production on higher priced (normally
higher margin) items and to discontinue lower priced articles. Such
actions necessarily increase the cost of living. To stem such concen-
tration on higher priced items during the transition period, the Ad-
ministrator developed and applied a modification of the supply stand-
ard."" The aim was to promote balance in the "product mix" of
manufacturers. 8  Some price actions made the taking of reconversion
price increases contingent upon the maintenance of normal proportions
of low-end production, 5 ' while others gave higher percentage increases
for low-end products. 6 ° In at least one instance a manufacturer was
denied the right to use the reconversion factor to increase his price
until he indicated that proper proportions of low-end goods would be
produced.''
D. Absorption at Distributive Levels
Since the announced policy of the Administrator was to have
peacetime goods return to the market at their 1942 retail prices," 2 and
since manufacturers had to be granted adjustments over their 1941-2
155. Increases were granted, e. g.: MPR 594, Rev. Ord. 4, Amendment 3, etc.,
11 FED. REG. 3495 et seq. (1946) ; 11 FED. REG. 10691 (1946) ; 11 FED. REG. 4814-25
(1946) ; MPR 598, Amendment 9, 11 FED. REG. 4386 (1946).
156. In announcing the overall policy, it was stated: "For example, prospects of
an early rate of production substantially in excess of 1941 production would negative
the possibility of hardship in many cases and make it unnecessary to increase existing
ceilings to reflect increases in costs. In other cases such special conditions as the
existence of large inventories of lower cost materials or the anticipation of wide-spread
model change would be factors to be considered in determining the time and amount
of increases in maximum prices." Statement of Considerations, supra note 154.
157. Discussed, supra, p. 521.
158. See Statement of Considerations Accompanying Supp. Ord. 119, supra note
133.
159. See, e. g., MPR 86, 10 FED. RE:. 12528 (1945) (low-end model output of
household washing machines and ironers had to be produced in same proportion as in
July 1940-June 1941 to entitle manufacturer to reconversion increase).
160. MPR 599, 10 FED. REG. 13522 (1945) (radios); MPR 188, Order 4800, 11
FED. REG. 206 (1946) (household furniture) ; 3d RMPR 213, 11 FED. REG. 394 (1946)
(metal beds).
161. MPR 86, Order 5, 10 FED. REG. 12469 (1945), permission granted by MPR
86, Order 6, 10 FED. REG. 13417 (1945).
162. OPA Release No. 5566, May 11, 1945.
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selling prices, some system of cost absorption by distributors had to
be maintained. The Executive Order which formalized the recon-
version policies, so directed.'6" Within the limits of the overall price
standards, every effort was made to comply with this directive.
The already developed standards of cost absorption-developed
for application to fthe distributive trades long before reconversion stand-
ards were applied-were carried over to reconversion pricing. These
standards determined whether and to what extent an increase author-
ized by an industry-wide price action in the maximum prices of the
manufacturers of an article, might be reflected in increases in maximum
prices of distributors of that article 64 Absorption was required down
to, but not beyond, the point where the ceiling price covered the seller's
total cost.6 5 If absorbing the manufacturer's increase forced a dis-
tributor to sell below his total cost, he was permitted to increase
his maximum price to the point where it did cover total cost. 66
In the case of distributors whose sales consisted solely or mainly
of the product whose cost to them had been increased, an absorption
down to the expense ratio would be illegally burdensome. In such
cases, or where the product constituted a large proportion of his sales,
a dealer was obliged to absorb the cost increase only to the point where
he was left with the average base period dollar margin over cost. 6
Where more than one distributor was involved between the manu-
facturer and the consumer, provision was made for the apportionment
of the absorption between them on an equitable basis. 6"
E. Decontrol of Commodities
Implicit in the Administrator's authority to impose maximum
prices under section 2 of the Act was his authority to withdraw them
individually or in groups as the need that justified their imposition
163. Exec. Ord. 9599, 10 FED. REG. 10155 (1945).
164. As originally applied, complete absorption, where possible, was required.
However, it later appeared that the administrative difficulties involved and the burden
upon the distributive trade in requiring absorption of individual manufacturer adjust-
ments no longer justified the policy of absorption in such cases, Supp. Ord. 153, 11
FED. REG. 32486 (1946).
165. If the sales of the product did not constitute a substantiaf part of the total
sales of the distributors, the distributors had to absorb cost increases down to the rate
of expenses to sales of the retail outlet. See also THIRTEENTH QuARTE LY REPorT
OF THE OFFIcE OF PRIcE AmMINISTRATION, submitted July 21, 1945, pp. 19-21. For
examples see MPR 591, Order 48, Amendment 8, 11 FFD. REG. 1258 (1946) (manu-
facturers' new price increases were passed through in exact dollar amount to preserve
distributors' percentage margin, which already equalled expense ratio) ; MPR 149,
Order 56, 11 FED. REG. 1649 (1946) (rubber mats and matting).
166. Supp. Ord. 145, 11 FED. REG. 1040 (1946) provided an automatic method of
calculating whether an increase might be added.
167. E. g., MPR 188, § 1499.159(e), Order 10, 11 FED. REG. 4059 (1946).
168. The absorption was normally divided between several distributors in the same
proportion as the dollar markup of each dealer bore to the total dollar markup at retail
over manufacturer's price. MPR 86, 10 FD. REG. 12528 (1945); MPR 188, Amend-
ment 70, 10 FED. REG. 13551 (1945).
530 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ceased to exist. This was confirmed by the statement in Executive
Order 9599 that one of the guiding policies of Government agencies
during the transition from war to peace was "to move as rapidly as
possible without endangering the stability of the economy toward the
removal of price, wage, production and other controls and toward
the restoration of collective bargaining and the free market." But
even before Executive Order 9599 was issued, the Administrator had
taken the first steps toward large scale decontrol by submitting to the
Director of Economic Stabilization a program for decontrol. This
program, approved in Directive 68,169 provided for suspension and
then exemption of all commodities where such action was not likely to
increase the price above the then existing level.' The fact that the
market price was then below the ceiling was only one of many factors
to be considered. Among the most important of the others was the
possibility of increased demand after removal of control.' The
Directive also provided for the exemption of all commodities not im-
portant to the cost of living or to business costs if their continued
control imposed an undue administrative burden, even though prices
would rise above the previous maximums, but only if exemption would
present no threat of diversion of needed materials, facilities, or
manpower.
Supplementary Orders 126,172 129,173 and 132 174 were attempts
at systematic and easily understandable actions of decontrol. Each
covered one major field of control, i. e., (1) consumer goods; (2)
machines, parts, industrial materials and services; and, (3) foods,
grains and cereals, feeds, tobacco and tobacco products, agricultural
chemicals, insecticides, and beverages. As new commodities could be
added to the lists of those already decontrolled or suspended, amend-
ments to the orders were issued. By July, 1946 when the decontrol
standards were markedly relaxed by the Price Control Extension Act
of 1946,17' a total of more than 100 amendments to the three orders
had been issued, covering an infinite number of commodities.
169. 10 FED. REG. 9388 (1945).
170. Statement of Considerations Accompanying Supp. Ord. 126, OPA SEavicm,
CONSUMER GoODs DE sK BooK, 9591.
171. Ibid. "In determining probable future demand such such factors as, (1) the
effect of withdrawal of any regulations by war supply agencies which have had the
effect of limiting demand, (2) potential export demand as world markets widen, (3)
new uses for the article if they are likely to be important in the near future, and (4)
fluctuations in demand resulting from the uneven impact of cutbacks in war produc-
tion and any temporary delays in the reconversion process, will all be given weight.
The fact that a price has fallen below the ceiling does not, of itself, indicate a stable
balance of demand and supply at that price."
172. 10 FED. REG. 10200 (1945).
173. 10 FED. REG. 11291 (1945).
174. 10 FED. REG. 11512 (1945).
175. Pub. L. 548, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 25, 1946).
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IV. THE LAST YEAR
The Price Control Extension Act of 1946,"6 which became effec-
tive after a period of three and one half weeks during which no controls
had been extant, made many changes in the standards to be applied by
the Administrator. It may almost categorically be said that every
major transition period policy pursued by the Administrator in an
attempt to hold prices as low as possible and achieve an equitable
balance betveen the need for price increases as an incentive to greater
production and the necessity for holding prices within reasonable
levels to prevent inflation met with disapproval by Congress, in part
or in whole. In most instances the disapproval took the form of an
amendment to the statute which required a change in such standards or
policies.
The new attitude of Congress is best evidenced by the shift in
emphasis required of the Administrator and made specific by the 1946
extension. A new section was added defining the "Purposes and
policies in the transition period." 177 Therein Congress affirmed that
"rapid attainment of production equal to demand is one of the neces-
sary and urgent objectives for the prevention of inflation and for the
achievement of a reasonable stability in the general level of prices"
and subsequently stated that "adequate prices are necessary stimulants
to the production thus desired." The objective was to make it worth
the producer's while to produce by raising his profits above what was
previously considered equitable and hope that the law of supply and
demand would take care of the consumer.
A. Adjustment Standard
The most pervasive change required by the new act commonly
referred to as the "Taft" amendment, was that provided for by Section
11 of the Extension Act.178  This Section added a standard for an
industry-wide adjustment which provided that the lower of the follow-
ing be met: (1) The average dollar price of the product in 1940 plus
the average increase in costs of production since 1940, or (2) the
average current total costs plus the industry's average over-all per-
centage profit on sales in 1940. In multiple product industries, the
two methods of computation might result in considerably different
prices since the first contemplated the use of the industry's average
margin on the particular product, applied dollar-wise, whereas the
second contemplated the industry's average margin on all products,
applied percentage-wise. In all industries, multiple product or single
176. Ibid.
177. § 1A of the Act.
178. Adding § 6 to the Act.
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line, either standard almost necessarily required, subject to the provisos
discussed below, an increase in some maximum prices.
Three provisos to this section prevented it from being a complete
substitute for the minimum standards of fairness and equity, at least
for manufacturers, producers and processors.
(1) Adjustments were required on the basis of this standard
only after petition therefor by an industry advisory committee and
after the submission by that committee of "comprehensive evidence
with respect to costs and prices."
(2) The standard need have been applied only to a "product"
which was defined as "any major item, or any article different in
character from other products of the industry."
(3) The adjustment need not have been made during any period
with respect to which it appeared that "a substantial expansion in the
production or use of the product would not be practicable or would
be practicable only by reducing the production of at least equally
needed products." In such a case, the only requirement was that
maximum prices of the product on the average equal its average cur-
rent total cost plus a reasonable profit.
In September 1946, the Administrator issued Supplementary
Order 183 17' in which he provided the procedure to be followed by
industry advisory committees in applying fot increases; and the order
also provided the standards the committees were required to meet. The
Administrator therein asserted that he would consider it necessary
for a committee to show that a 15% increase in production would be
practicable before he would consider a requested adjustment pursuant
to either of the two main standards. Little action was taken under
this section, however. Undoubtedly many industry committees were
busily preparing petitions when decontrol of all commodities except
rent, sugar and rice made such petitions unnecessary.
B. Distributors' Markups
As indicated above, the Administrator made frequent use of the
policy of requiring distributors to absorb part or all of an increase
granted to a manufacturer, if such absorption left the distributor in a
generally fair and equitable position. However, under Section 10 (t)
of the 1946 Act,180 continued attempts to require absorption were out-
lawed, and, in fact, where absorption had been ordered between March
31 and July 1, 1946, regulations had to be amended so as no longer
to require it.
179. 11 FED. REG. 10519 (1946).
180. Adding paragraph (t) to section 2 of the Emergency Price Control Act.
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Pursuant to this section many actions setting distributors' prices,
where the manufacturer-supplier had been granted an increase between
April 1 and July 1, 1946, had to be adjusted."8' In many others,
involving increases at the manufacturing level and made after July
25, 1946, the Administrator had to permit a full percentage pass-
through of the increase to the ultimate consumer.'
Other provisions of the 1946 act affecting distributors' markups,
although worded in general terms, were the handiwork of special
lobbying groups, designed to give special treatment to certain groups.
The resulting amendments affected primarily automobile, farm ma-
chinery and refrigerator distributors. 8 '
C. Wool and Cotton Products
Section 14 of the 1946 Extension was designed to prevent the
Administrator from pursuing another one of the policies he had adopted
to prevent unnecessary increases. The Administrator, in adminis-
tering the "Bankhead" Amendment of the 1944 Extension, 8 4 had,
without Congressional challenge, and quite correctly in view of the
language and purpose of section 3 of the Stabilization Act, interpreted
that Amendment to require the price for cotton products to reflect only
parity, even if the actual cost, i. e., market price, of cotton was above
parity.
The 1946 Extension specifically required the use of current costs
or parity, whichever was higher. At the same time, the Extension
Act adopted the skeleton of the rest of the formula that the Adminis-,
trator had devised: cost, plus weighted average of mill conversion
costs, plus a reasonable profit. However, in defining reasonable profit,
the Extension Act emasculated the formula by changing the base
period to 1939-1941 and requiring the use of average unit profit instead
of industry profit ratio to net worth. As thus amended, the coverage
of the section was extended to wool and wool products in addition to
cotton and cotton products. These changes, like the distributor pro-
181. Between early August and November 1946, approximately 100 actions in this
category were taken raising distributor prices to comply with the requirements. A
wide range of important cost of living and cost of housing (construction) commodities
were included. See, e. g., Supp. Ord. 172, 11 FED. REG. 8674 (1946) (building and con-
struction materials).
182. More than 100 actions were taken in this connection, including, again, many
affecting basic consumer goods and construction materials. See, e. g., Supp Reg. 14C,
Amendment 19, 11 FED. REG. 8449 (1946) (corn products). Note that subsection (t)
does not permit merely a dollar and cent pass-through. The effect of the increase is
cumulative, with each distributor adding the dollar and cent increase to his price plus
his own percentage of that increase.
183. Subsections (q) (r) and (s) of section 10 of the 1946 Act, which added sub-
sections (q) (r) and (s) to § 2 of the Emergency Price Control Act.
184. Discussed, mipra, p. 512.
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visions, required a flood of price adjustments upward.185  And the
mill adjustments merely started a spiral. As indicated in the early
statement of considerations, the cotton fabric increase was to be
passed on by textile manufacturers to apparel distributors who, of
course, under the provisions of the Extension Act, passed it on-per-
centagewise-to the consumer.
D. Miscellaneous Pricing Provisions
The Price Control Extension Act of 1946 was a veritable "log
roll" of special interest amendments. Maintenance of low end produc-
tion was emasculated by one such amendment.8 6
Many groups received special consideration of one sort or another
including hotels, fish and sea food dealers, nylon hosiery manufacturers,
service establishments, restaurants, logs and lumber dealers, importers
and producers of new commodities.
1 7
E. Decontrol
With respect to dencontrol, too, Congress evidenced a desire for
greater speed. The standards adopted by the Administrator required
no change, but Congress made it clear that it felt that they were too
rigidly applied.
Section 3 of the Extension Act 1s added many new procedural
provisions relating to decontrol,8 9 including the establishment of a
Price Decontrol Board, as well as new substantive requirements.
Decontrol followed swiftly after these amendments. No longer
were the limitations, theretofore heeded, as to what was a meeting of
supply and demand, applicable. The mandate was explicit to remove
when supply "is in approximate balance with the demand." The
Administrator obviously was also still empowered to decontrol where
the administrative burden was disproportionate to the gain.
The decontrol of meat and meat products on October 15, 1946,1"°
pursuant to a Presidential directive so to do, was made on the basis
of standards that did not appear in the Act: political needs. At a
politically critical moment meat almost completely disappeared from the
185. The first of the increases came shortly, on August 14, 1946. Supp. Ord. 131,
Amendments 30 and 31, 11 FED. REG. 8530, 8865 (1946).
186. § 10(p) of the 1946 extension and 2(p) of the Emergency Price Control Act.
187. §§2(6) (I), (J), (K), (U), (V), and (X) of the Act.
188. § 1A of the Emergency Price Control Act.
189. Among the novel provisions of the section were those which provided an addi-
tional one month holiday from control for certain products with the proviso as to some
that no recontrol was possible without the consent of the Secretary of Agriculture
and the Price Decontrol Board, and as to others, that the Price Decontrol Board might
order that they be not recontrolled at the end of the "holiday." §§ IA (e) (7) and
lA(e) (8) (A).
190. Supp. Ord. 132, Amendment 64, 11 FED. RaG. 12093 (1946).
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market. As a result of the decontrol of meat, all commodities were
decontrolled four weeks later. On November 10, again after a
Presidential directive, the Administrator issued Supplementary Order
193 which exempted from control all commodities except rent, sugar,
syrups, molasses, and rice. 91
CONCLUSION
The price control program, from start to finish, required con-
stant vigilance. When the legal standards were not being changed,
the economic conditions were. It was a constant battle to maintain
legality and, at the same time, to carry out the purposes of the Act.
In view of the magnitude of the chore, and of the circumstances under
which price control was established and maintained, the results were
truly remarkable. The instances in which the Administrator was
reversed by the Emergency Court of Appeals, whose job it was to
pass on the validity of administrative actions, 92 were extremely few.9 3
While there undoubtedly were many instances where individuals
were certain that the Administrator's actions were illegal, the real
test lies in the fact that few of his actions were overruled by the courts
which reviewed them. At the same time, stabilization was maintained
to a degree almost unbelievable in view of all the circumstances under
which the program functioned. The alarming rise in prices that has
occurred since the demise of the OPA is convincing, even dramatic,
evidence of the effectiveness of the job done by the agency.
191. 11 FED. REG. 13464 (1946).
192. § 204(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act.
193. From January 1942 through May 31, 1947, 409 complaints were filed with
the Emergency Court of Appeals. In only 60 cases were the decisions adverse to the
Administrator in whole or in part. TWENTY-SEcOND QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE
OFFIcE OF PRIcE ADmINISTRATION (May 31, 1947).
